LIBYA AND INTERESTS OF RUSSIA

10.31857/S032150750009872-1

Alexei M. VASILIEV
member, Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS); Honorary President, Institute for African Studies, RAS; Head, Chair, African and Arab Studies, Russia’s Friendship University (RUDN University); Editor-in-Chief, “Aziya i Afrika segodnya” journal ( This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. )

Leonid M. ISSAEV
PhD (Political Science), Associate Professor, National Research University Higher School of Economics; Senior Research Fellow, Institute for African Studies, RAS, and RUDN University ( This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. )

Alexander A. TKACHENKO
PhD (Economics), Head, Center of North Africa and African Horn Studies, Institute for African Studies, RAS ( This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. )

Vladimir Yu. KUKUSHKIN
PhD (Economics), Senior Research Fellow, Institute for African Studies, RAS ( This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. ; This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. )

Natalia A. ZHERLITSYNA
PhD (History), Senior Research Fellow, Institute for African Studies, RAS; Associated Professor, RUDN University ( This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. )

   Currently, there are two opposing “governments” in Libya: the Faiz Saraj’s Government of National Accord in Tripoli, recognized by the international community, and the cabinet of ministers in the east of the country, which is supported by the Libyan National Army led by Khalifa Haftar and relies on the “legitimate” parliament - the House Representatives.

   So far, attempts by the parties to come to a settlement within the framework of a political agreement have not yielded results. Meanwhile, it was the civil war and the difficult social and economic conditions associated with it, the collapse of state administration, the inaction of laws, the flourishing of violence that are key factors in the presence of radical jihadist groups in Libya. In April 2019, Haftar announced the start of an offensive on Tripoli. The offensive soon lost momentum, as forces in western Libya associated with the Government of National Accord joined forces to prevent the advance of Haftar’s troops. This event is noteworthy not only because Haftar failed to overcome the resistance of the forces of the Government of National Accord, but also because the more tangible the prospect of the capture of the capital by the Libyan national army became, the fewer allies remained within Libya itself.

   Despite the intricacies of the Libyan civil conflict, a more or less stable system of checks and balances has developed within the country, which does not allow any of the forces to occupy a dominant position in the military-political system of Libya. The situation is still stalemate.