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Входит в Russian Science Citation Index

«Азия и Африка сегодня» № 6 2020

DOI 10.31857/S032150750009876-5

Tatiana S. RUDNEVA
Post-graduate student, National Research University Higher School of Economics ( Этот адрес электронной почты защищен от спам-ботов. У вас должен быть включен JavaScript для просмотра. )


   In order to join the European Union, candidate countries have to meet a specific set of conditions (the Copenhagen criteria), which include maintaining stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. Incentivising the countries wanting to join the EU to strengthen democratic institutions, EU membership conditionality - tying the possibility of membership to compliance with membership conditions - is considered to be an effective tool for promoting democracy and the rule of law. However, the effectiveness of conditionality was recently questioned by an authoritarian turn in Turkey and democratic backsliding in other candidate countries.

   The question that arises from recent developments is whether EU membership conditionality, based on rewards rather than sanctions (“positive” conditionality), is equipped to deal with democratic backsliding in candidate countries. This article closely examines the EU’s choice of responses addressing the problem of democratic deterioration in Turkey, the country with the most drastic dismantling of democratic institutions amongst the candidate countries, and assesses the scope and limits of the tools the EU employed to redress severe democratic backsliding.

   The article concludes that positive conditionality by itself is limitedly equipped to effectively counteract the consolidation of authoritarianism. For Turkey, the situation was also aggravated by the lack of expertise on the part of the EU, which previously had no experience in dealing with democratic backsliding in candidate countries. Additionally, there were instances of conditionality being applied inconsistently, compromising its credibility. What also affected the application of conditionality is the leverage Turkey gained in EU-Turkey relations due to the EU’s need to enlist the country’s support in curbing the flow of Syrian refugees to Europe. Combined, the problems resulted in the ineffectiveness of measures taken to counteract democratic deterioration in Turkey.

Ключевые слова EU conditionality, EU enlargement, democratic backsliding, Turkey 
Страницы 37-42

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